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ABSTRACT
The Texaco/Chevron lawsuit, which started in November 1993 and is still being litigated
in 2020, is a prominent example of the process of judicialization of environmental conflict.
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs claim that the oil company’s operations generated ruinous
impacts on the environment and on the development prospects and health of nearby
individuals and communities. The tortuous and lengthy judiciary process was further
hindered by an arbitration process, an Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanism
nested in the Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. The significance of the
case goes beyond the specifics of Ecuador and provides further arguments fuelling the
protracted legitimacy crisis experienced by International Investment Agreements. The
current praxis of Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms is generating an asym-
metrical system, protecting the interest of investors, and intruding into the space of human
and environmental rights. These issues are resonating with social movements, activist
scholars and policy makers who are reacting to the vulnerabilities engendered by Inter-
national Investment Agreements through multipronged strategies. These asymmetries
provide ammunition to resist the signing of new International Investment Agreements,
support the inclusion of human and environmental rights safeguards in International
Investment Agreements, and contribute to the rationale of pre-empting extractive projects
that are likely to produce severe environmental liabilities. Some of the potential ways in
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which a somewhat more level playing field can be created include, in addition to denounc-
ing investment agreements, transforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms
towards a format that can also accommodate the complaints of affected communities or
enacting moratoria on extraction projects that are prone to adverse socioenvironmental
impacts. Both strategies could prove to be productive avenues towards the achievement
of justice.
INTRODUCTION
In November 1993, Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Texaco
in the Southern District of New York on behalf of some 30,000 inhabitants of the
Ecuadorian Amazon.1 The plaintiffs argued that during its operations in Ecuador
between 1964 and 1992, Texaco had caused massive environmental impacts, ultimately
leading to several adverse effects on the local population, including higher-than-normal
morbidity and mortality rates. The US court refused to admit the case and it was
eventually handled in a provincial court in Ecuador and resulted in a 2013 decision that
condemned Chevron (which had acquired Texaco) to a payment of 9500 million USD
in compensation for the affected communities.
Fast forward to August 2018, an arbitration tribunal constituted under the auspices
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague decided that the state of
Ecuador has to act to render unenforceable the judgment of the Ecuadorian judiciary
that condemned Chevron because it found that the corporation was not given a fair
trial.2 Although this decision will not be the final chapter in the quest for justice of the
Amazonian people v Texaco/Chevron, it is a major setback and might be the final nail in
the coffin for the hope of obtaining justice through the judiciary route.
By 2020, the case has been litigated for 27 years in various fora, including the
USA, Ecuador, Argentina, Canada, and international courts, and came to represent one
outstanding example of how protracted lawfare makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to hold multinational companies accountable for their actions.3 This paper sketches
the tortuous history of the Texaco/Chevron case, focusing on the role of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty, which was signed by Ecuador and the USA in 1993 and entered
into force in 1998, the associated investor protection clauses and arbitration enacted
through the Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. We discuss this
episode of lawfare in light of the environmental justice literature and in particular of
the judicialization of environmental policy.4 We also discuss investors’ rights in relation
1 United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit., Aguinda ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’ v. Texaco Inc., 16 August 2002.
2 ‘Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2009–23’ (2019), italaw https://www.italaw.com/cases/257 (visited 2 December 2019).
3 Sarah Joseph, ‘Protracted lawfare: the tale of Chevron Texaco in the Amazon’, Journal of Human Rights and
the Environment 3 (2012), at 70.
4 Antonio Herman Benjamin, ‘We, the Judges, and the Environment’, Pace Environmental Law Review 29
(2011), at 582; Teresa Kramarz, David Cosolo and Alejandro Rossi, ‘Judicialization of environmental policy
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to environmental and human rights in the context of fragmentation and disintegration
of legal regimes.5
The significance of these discussions goes far beyond the specific case of Ecuador.
The current trends in international investment policies show an increase in the number
of agreements and in 2018 40 new International Investment Agreements (IIAs) were
concluded, adding to the total of 3317 existing agreements.6 At the same time there is
an increase in agreements’ terminations with at least 20 unilateral ones taking effect in
2019.7 These agreements have come under scrutiny for a number of reasons, including
the ones corroborated by the Texaco/Chevron case, and are experiencing a protracted
legitimacy crisis.8 However, allegedly comprehensive attempts to reform the institu-
tional architecture of IIAs continue to fall short of addressing their most substantial
deficiencies.9
The experience of the Texaco/Chevron case illuminates how the current praxis
of ISDS mechanisms is generating an asymmetrical system, protecting the interest of
investors and intruding into the space of human and environmental rights. These issues
are resonating with the broad community of concerned people: social movements,
activist scholars, and policy makers are reacting to the vulnerabilities engendered by
IIAs through multipronged, and at times overlapping, strategies. The acknowledgement
of these asymmetries provide ammunition to resist the signing of new IIAs, support the
inclusion of human and environmental rights safeguards in these agreements, and can
provide a decisive contribution to the rationale of pre-empting extractive projects that
are likely to produce severe environmental liabilities in a context of corporate impunity.
Overall, the paper argues that investment agreements, especially when they come
with ISDS mechanisms, create structural barriers for the realization of social and
environmental justice in Ecuador and beyond, including developed country contexts.
This is because they limit the possibility of recourse to national courts by communities
and individuals affected by an investment (which is often the only legal forum available
to them) and also severely constrain the ability of nation-states to pass legislation
that can be used to curb the excesses of multinational corporations. The paper also
discusses some of the potential ways in which a somewhat more level playing field can be
created. In addition to denouncing investment agreements, transforming ISDS mecha-
nisms towards a format where they can also accommodate the complaints of affected
communities or enacting moratoria on extraction projects that are prone to adverse
socioenvironmental impacts could both prove to be productive avenues towards the
achievement of environmental justice. The profound transformations that are necessary
to address the shortcomings of the current investment regime could seem far-fetched,
5 See Federica Violi and Francesco Montanaro, in this issue.
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones. (New York; Geneva: United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2019) https://doi.org/10.18356/8a8d05f9-en.
7 Ibid., at 99–100.
8 David Schneiderman, ‘International Investment Law’s Unending Legitimation Project’, Loyola University of
Chicago Law Journal 49 (2017), at 229.
9 Alessandra Arcuri and Federica Violi, ‘Human Rights and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Changing
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but they are on par with the challenge at hand and with the implications of the regime,
exemplified by the Texaco/Chevron case. In fact, the ambition of these reforms is not
dissimilar to reforms that have been successful in the past—abolition of slavery, gender
rights, or the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to mention a few. Although at first these
changes appeared utopian, they did succeed in becoming the norm.10
The next section provides a brief outline of the Texaco/Chevron case. Section 2
introduces critically IIAs and the role played by international arbitration in this case.
Section 3 presents a rights perspective showing how the protection of investor rights
undermines competing rights and section 4 takes stock exploring various ways to take
on the shortcomings of the current architecture of IIAs, especially for the extractive
industry sector.
I. THE TEXACO/CHEVRON CASE
The civil lawsuit, Aguinda v Texaco Inc filed in 1993, focused on the socioenvironmental
liabilities engendered by Texaco during operations in the Ecuadorian Amazon, known
as the Oriente.11 Texaco discovered the first commercially-viable petroleum deposit in
1967, and operated the first commercial oil well in 1972 after the construction of an
approximately 500 km long pipeline. From 1977, Texaco was the operational partner of
a joint venture with the state-owned Ecuadorian oil company (first CEPE, then Petroe-
cuador).12 Texaco drilled 339 oil wells, constructed 18 central production stations,
1000 km secondary pipelines, 600 km of roads, and extracted 1.5 billion barrels of
crude. Oil operations produce large quantity of waste, mostly in the form of highly con-
taminating produced waters, also known as oil field brines, which contain a number of
potentially toxic agents, including radioactive isotopes, dispersed hydrocarbons, heavy
metals, high levels of salt, and come to the surface at high temperature.13 The untreated
discharge of produced water is known since long as the cause of severe environmental
and public health impacts.14 Texaco operations routinely discarded untreated produced
10 Peter Newell and Andrew Simms, ‘Towards a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty’, Climate Policy (2019), at
1; Rutger Bregman, Utopia for realists: And how we can get there (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017).
11 See above n 1.
12 The events and the timeline are based on Stacie Buccina, Douglas Chene and Jeffrey Gramlich, ‘Accounting
for the environmental impacts of Texaco’s operations in Ecuador: Chevron’s contingent environmental
liability disclosures’, 2 Accounting Forum 37 (2013), at 110; Judith Kimerling, The Environmental Audit
of Texaco’s Amazon Oil Fields: Environmental Justice or Business as Usual (HeinOnline, 1994). Details of
the lawsuit are presented here: ‘Texaco/Chevron lawsuits (re Ecuador)’ (2019), Business & Human Rights
Resource Centre https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador (visited 2
December 2019). For the Texaco/Chevron version of the facts, see ‘Ecuador Lawsuit’ (2019), Chevron
https://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (visited 2 December 2019)., the perspective of the claimants is avail-
able here: ‘ChevronToxico: The Campaign for Justice in Ecuador’ (2019), Clean Up Ecuador campaign,
Amazon Watch https://chevrontoxico.com/ (visited 2 December 2019).
13 Martí Orta-Martínez, Lorenzo Pellegrini and Murat Arsel, ‘“The squeaky wheel gets the grease”? The conflict
imperative and the slow fight against environmental injustice in northern Peruvian Amazon’, 3 Ecology and
Society 23 (2018), at 1.
14 Martí Orta-Martínez et al., ‘First evidences of Amazonian wildlife feeding on petroleum-contaminated soils:
A new exposure route to petrogenic compounds?’, Environmental research 160 (2018), at 514; Raúl Yusta-
García et al, ‘Water contamination from oil extraction activities in Northern Peruvian Amazonian rivers’,
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waters in 800–1000 unlined open waste pits—estimates suggest that approximately 19
billion gallons of production waters have been disposed without any treatment other
than dilution.15 Another ‘waste’ product is gas that was in its large majority flared at
the production stations leading to air as well as soil and water contamination since,
because of imperfect separation, it contained oil residues. A total of 16.8 million gallons
of crude is estimated to have been spilled by the Texaco operation in the Amazon
basin, including accidental spills as well as the practice of spraying unpaved roads with
oil to decrease dust and maintain them.16 Additional pollution was generated by the
disposal of chemical compounds that are part of drilling and maintenance waste, air,
and noise pollution generated at oil wells, production, and transportation sites. The
deliberate and unplanned discharges of pollutants in the environment resulted in the
contamination of superficial and underground water sources used by local population
for human use and for fishing and affected soils used to produce crops, undermining
subsistence practices of indigenous population, and ultimately affecting human health.
Texaco operated with little oversight given the weakness of the Ecuadorian regulatory
framework which nevertheless required to minimize impacts on the environment and
human health.17 Moreover, even though by the 1970s principles in international law
established human rights and the environment as focal areas (e.g. the Stockholm Decla-
ration from 1972),18 also with reference to the rights of indigenous people, Texaco’s
operations in the 1960s and 1970s ‘did not meet well-known and accepted industry
standards’ and were substandard also compared to its own practices in the USA at the
time.19
The oil operations were also marked by violent encounters with indigenous people
and the company collaborated with the US-based protestant Summer Institute of
Linguistic to pacify and relocate the Huaorani people who tried to resist the entry
of outsiders into their territories.20 Taken together, these developments contributed
to the disappearance of several indigenous groups whose territories were affected by
infrastructural development, encroachment by settlers and whose subsistence strategies
were impacted by reduced access to territory and by contamination.
15 Judith Kimerling, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, Chevron
Texaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco’(2006)’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
38 (2006), at 413, at 450; Sana Loue, ‘Forensic Epidemiology and Environmental Justice’, in Forensic
Epidemiology in the Global Context (Springer, 2013) 99–119, at 102; Bill Powers and Mark Quarles, ‘Texaco’s
waste management practices in Ecuador were illegal and violated industry standards. Chevron’s Sham
Science: Illegal Waste Dumping (Report): Critical Analysis of Chevron’s Science: Submission 2′ , E-Tech
International 2 (2006).
16 See Kimerling, above n 12, The Environmental Audit of Texaco’s Amazon Oil Fields, at 205; See Kimerling,
above n 15, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia, at 450.
17 Judith Kimerling, ‘Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: Indigenous Amazonian Peoples and
Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Agunda v. Texaco’, (2008).
18 Louis B Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’, Harvard International Law Journal
14 (1973), at 423.
19 See Powers and Quarles, above n 15, at 1.
20 See Kimerling, above n 15, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia, at 460–462; Laura M Rival,
Trekking through history: the Huaorani of Amazonian Ecuador (Columbia University Press, 2002); David Stoll,
‘The Summer Institute of Linguistics and indigenous movements’, 2 Latin American Perspectives 9 (1982),
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Compounds associated with oil extraction can affect human health through inhala-
tion, ingestion, and dermatological absorption and the practices of Texaco allegedly
produced impacts through all of these channels. The first epidemiological studies
produced in the area, which were also introduced by the plaintiffs in the lawsuit as probe
of health impacts,21 provide circumstantiated evidence of increased morbidity and mor-
tality associated with the oil operations.22 The population living in the proximity of oil
wells has been found to be exposed to high levels of total petroleum hydrocarbons and
experience a higher-than-normal incidence of cancer cases and childhood leukaemia,23
and pregnancies are more likely to end in spontaneous abortions.24 Given the dearth of
reliable environmental monitoring and health data, a popular epidemiology approach
has been developed to collect and analyse evidence.25
Although the quality of forensic evidence is certainly less than perfect,26 the lack
of environmental monitoring and health data can also be attributed to the way Texaco
disregarded, or purposely concealed, the impact of its operations and did not collect
environmental, health, nor socioeconomic data. Although evidence of practices and
awareness from the side of the company is rather sparse, during the proceedings of
the lawsuit witnesses and the company itself produced evidence of use of substandard
techniques in order to enhance the economic returns of the operations. For example,
an internal memo from Texaco instructs that earthen waste pits should not be lined
because the procedure that substantially decreases the spread of contaminants to the
environment would be too expensive.27 Another internal memo from Texaco (dating
back to 1972) produced in court, instructed the managers in Ecuador to destroy all
reports of oil spills and from that point onward to report only spills that already
attracted the attention of the public, mass media, and/or regulatory authorities.28 When
leaving Ecuador, together with the transition of the operations that were taken over
by Petroecuador, Texaco engaged in some remediation and compensation activities
that remained highly contentious. Environmental remediation included the treatment
21 Anna-Karin Hurtig and Miguel San Sebastián, ‘Epidemiology vs epidemiology: the case of oil exploitation
in the Amazon basin of Ecuador’, International journal of epidemiology 34 (2005), at 1170.
22 See Loue, above n 15, at 102–103; Miguel San Sebastián et al., ‘Exposures and cancer incidence near oil
fields in the Amazon basin of Ecuador’, Occupational Environmental Medicine 58 (2001), at 517; Miguel
San Sebastián, B Armstrong and C Stephens, ‘Outcomes of pregnancy among women living in the proximity
of oil fields in the Amazon basin of Ecuador’, International Journal Occupational Environmental Health 8
(2002), at; Miguel San Sebastián and Anna Karin Hurtig, ‘Oil development and health in the Amazon basin
of Ecuador: the popular epidemiology process’, Social science & medicine 60 (2005), at 799.
23 Anna-Karin Hurtig and Miguel San Sebastián, ‘Incidence of childhood leukemia and oil exploitation in the
Amazon basin of Ecuador’, 3 International journal of occupational and environmental health 10 (2004), at
245; See San Sebastián et al, above n 22.
24 See San Sebastián, Armstrong, and Stephens, above n 22.
25 See San Sebastián and Hurtig, above n 22.
26 Cristina O’Callaghan-Gordo, Martí Orta-Martínez and Manolis Kogevinas, ‘Health effects of non-
occupational exposure to oil extraction’, Environmental Health 15 (2016), at 56.
27 See, Tom Knudson, ‘Chevron in Ecuador: Testimony Ends in Oil Giant’s Ecuador Trial’ (30 October 2003),
Sacramento Bee/Chevron in Ecuador https://chevroninecuador.org/news-and-multimedia/2003/1030-te
stimony-ends-in-oil-giant-s-ecuador-trial (visited 2 December 2019).
28 See, ‘Texaco Ordered Destruction of Oil Spill Documents’ (2008), Chevron in Ecuador https://chevroni
necuador.org/news-and-multimedia/2008/1015-texaco-ordered-destruction-of-oil-spill-documents
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and backfilling of approximately 250 waste pits and several spill sites were investigated,
leaving the large majority of the contaminated sites out of the remediation activities.
Also, remediation activities have been performed without supervision and, based on
reports from several eyewitnesses, it has been argued that the practice was substandard
and might even have spread further contamination in the environment.29 Compen-
sation involved rushed procedures to disburse payments to indigenous federations
(representing only a part of the indigenous nationalities) for a total of 1 million USD,
payment for the construction of educational facilities for another 1 million USD, the
provision of an aircraft to be managed jointly by four indigenous federations and funds
to four municipalities and the Sucumbíos Province, totalling to approximately 6.7
million USD.30 The hurried nature of these disbursements and the lack of transparency
on the agreements and on the way the monies were to be managed have been a source
of continued contention in the area.
When Texaco and Chevron merged in 2001, the lawsuit continued with the sur-
viving company, Chevron. In 2001, the US District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed the lawsuit on grounds of forum non-conveniens, on the condition
that Chevron agreed to litigate the issues in Ecuador, a decision upheld in 2002.31
Since then, the lawsuit has moved through the Ecuadorian judiciary and in 2013 the
National Court of Justice finally decided that the defendant is responsible for socioen-
vironmental damages.32 The claimants obtained a substantial award of approximately
9500 million USD for environmental remediation (treatment of waste, restoration of
soil quality, and aquatic and terrestrial fauna and flora), provision of water services,
implementation of mitigation measures for irreversible damage to human health and
culture, community reconstruction and ethnical reaffirmation, compensation for public
health problems and funding for the organization representing the claimants.33 The
decision is enforceable under Ecuadorian law, but Chevron refused to disburse the
funds and, since the company has no assets left in Ecuador, the plaintiffs have had to
initiate new legal proceedings in other countries to access the funds.34
Before providing further detail on the international legal contentions around this
case, it would also be important to contextualize it within broader national political
29 See Kimerling, above n 15, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia, at 501–506.
30 Ibid., at 506–512.
31 The decision was taken on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine that empowers courts to decline
jurisdiction if they consider that another court can hear a case more conveniently. See above n 1. See
Joseph, above n 3, Protracted lawfare; See Kimerling, above n 15, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier
in Amazonia, at 625.
32 Corte Nacional de Justicia, Maria Aguinda Salazar y otros v. Chevron Corporation, 11 December 2013.
33 Judith Kimerling, ‘Oil, contract, and conservation in the Amazon: Indigenous Huaorani, Chevron, and
Yasuni’, Colorado Journal Intional Environmental Law & Policy 24 (2013), at 43, at 75–76.
34 Supreme Court of Canada, Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, SCR, 4 September 2015. The outcome of the case was
unfavourable for the plaintiffs. On the accusations of unfair practices in the US courts levied against Chevron,
see Marco Simons, ‘What you Think you Know About Chevron and Steven Donziger is Wrong’ (2015),
EarthRights International https://earthrights.org/blog/what-you-think-you-know-about-chevron-and-ste
ven-donziger-is-wrong/ (visited 20 April 2020); James North, ‘How a Human Rights Lawyer Went From







/jiel/article/23/2/455/5878138 by guest on 11 M
arch 2021
462 • International Investment Agreements, Human Rights, and Environmental Justice
processes. Ecuador has a vibrant civil society, in which indigenous people play a promi-
nent role. The emergence of oil extraction as a presumed engine of national economic
development has changed their relationship with the Ecuadorian state, moving them
and their Amazonian territories from the sidelines to the centre of national debates.35
Whereas up until the 1950s the Ecuadorian state treated them with (benign) neglect,
the decision to capitalize on the rich natural resources in the Amazon has resulted
in a more direct and often conflictive relationship. Although they have often been
sidelined from national decision-making processes, they have nevertheless proven to be
efficacious organizers in periodic uprisings that have in the past caused major national
crises, even leading to the fall of governments.36 Grievances arising from extractive
processes are an increasingly important theme in the conflicts between indigenous
groups and the state.37
The growth of the environmental civil society in Ecuador has taken place simultane-
ously at the local and national level. In the Amazon, for example, affected (indigenous
and mestizo) communities have formed local non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as Frente de Defensa de la Amazonía (Amazon Defense Coalition) and the Unión
de Afectados y Afectadas por las Operaciones Petroleras de Texaco (Union of People
Affected by the Petroleum Operations of Texaco). These have been supported by
entities operating out of Quito such as Acción Ecológica. These, in turn, were able to
connect with international NGOs such as the Amazon Watch and legal campaigners
such as Steven Donziger from the USA, who has played a leading role in formulating and
executing the legal strategy discussed below. This multilayered network of civil society
organizations has been effective in putting and maintaining the ChevronTexaco case in
national and international consciousness. Celebrities such as Sting, Roger Waters, Brad
Pitt, Trudie Styler, and Angelina Jolie have expressed their support. Local activists Pablo
Fajardo Mendoza and Luis Yanza, who played important roles in the Texaco/Chevron
case, were recognized with the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in 2008.38
II. THE ECUADOR—UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATY AND THE
CHEVRON ARBITRATION
IIAs in general, and bilateral investment treaties in particular, are arrangements between
countries that are set up in order to promote and protect investment. The treaties’
concrete aim is to create a stable and favourable institutional environment that facilitates
the flow of investment across borders by way of reducing ‘risks’ for foreign investors.39
35 Murat Arsel, Barbara Hogenboom and Lorenzo Pellegrini, ‘The extractive imperative in Latin America’, The
Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016), at 880.
36 Marc Becker, ‘Ecuador’s Social Movements, Electoral Politics, and Military Coups’. Oxford Research Ency-
clopedia of Politics.
37 Lorenzo Pellegrini and Murat Arsel, ‘Oil and Conflict in the Ecuadorian Amazon: An Exploration of Motives
and Objectives’, July–December European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 106 (2018), at
209.
38 Alexander Zaitchik and Alexander Zaitchik, ‘Sludge Match: Inside Chevron’s 9 Billion Dollar Legal Battle in
Ecuador’ (28 August 2014), Rolling Stone https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/sludge-ma
tch-inside-chevrons-9-billion-legal-battle-with-ecuadorean-villagers-71779/ (visited 8 May 2020); Eliza-
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The underpinning rationale justifying the existence of these agreements rests on the
assumption that investment flows are conducive to socioeconomic development of
sending and receiving countries—although any such straight and unqualified posi-
tive relationship between investment and development has been convincingly ques-
tioned.40 The process of development, which should be stimulated through interna-
tional investment, would then trickle down to benefit the population at large, which
is also a highly disputed proposition even in the experience of rich countries.41 In the
extractive industries, in particular, even focusing only on economic growth as a measure
of success, the relationship between the extractive sector and the economy is elusive
at best as demonstrated by the extensive literature on the ‘resource curse.42’43 In fact,
a political economy analysis of the socioenvironmental liabilities associated with the
extraction of non-renewable resources indicates that increased extraction can produce
episodes of ‘immiserizing growth’, where the increasing size of the economy contributes
to phenomena of dispossession, lowered socioeconomic standards and narrowed down
prospects of broadly conceived socioeconomic development for already marginalized
sections of the population.44
Although support for the adoption of IIAs is somewhat paradoxical, since their
rationale rests on disputed and (in part) fallacious premises, these agreements allow
for investors’ interests to prevail over other concerns since they create an asymmetrical
litigation mechanism, the ISDS mechanism. Investor–state disputes are asymmetrical
and redistribute power in favour of investors, since they allow companies to bring states
to arbitration tribunals but not vice versa. As a result, they compress the policy space
of the state and can undermine the rule of law.45 Even more importantly in relation
to the Texaco/Chevron case, this mechanism undermines competing rights that are
potentially also affected by investment decisions—such as human and environmental
rights.46 Thus, concerned parties that are affected by investors’ operations experience
a contraction of multiple rights: they have no access to arbitration tribunals, litigation
39 See Schneiderman, above n 8.
40 Dani Rodrik, ‘Populism and the Economics of Globalization’, 1–2 Journal of International Business Policy 1
(2018), at 12; Joseph-E Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (New York and London: Norton, 2002).
41 Daphne T Greenwood and Richard PF Holt, ‘Growth, inequality and negative trickle down’, 2 Journal of
Economic Issues 44 (2010), at 403.
42 See Arsel, Hogenboom, and Pellegrini, above n 35.
43 Elissaios Papyrakis and Lorenzo Pellegrini, ‘The Resource Curse in Latin America’, in Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Politics (2019); See UNCTAD, above n 6, at 91–96; F Van der Ploeg, ‘Natural resources:
Curse or blessing?’, Journal of Economic Literature 49 (2011), at 366.
44 Murat Arsel, Lorenzo Pellegrini and Carlos Mena, ‘Maria’s paradox and the misery of missing development
alternatives in the Ecuadorian Amazon’, in Shaffer, P, R Kanbur, and R Sandbrook (ed), Immiserizing Growth:
When Growth Fails the Poor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 203–225; Lorenzo Pellegrini and
Murat Arsel, ‘Oil and Conflict in the Ecuadorian Amazon: An Exploration of Motives and Objectives’,
July–December European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 106 (2018), at 209.
45 Alessandra Arcuri, ‘The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in International Investment Arbitration’,
Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (2018), at; See Rodrik, above n 40.
46 Lorenzo Cotula and Nicolás M Perrone, Reforming investor-state dispute settlement: what about third-party
rights? (London: IIED, 2019) https://pubs.iied.org/17638IIED/?a=Lorenzo+Cotula. See also Lorenzo
Cotula, ‘(Dis)integration in global resource governance: commercial pressures, human rights and investment
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through domestic courts can be overturned by arbitration and, their influence on policy
making is constrained since the states’ policy space is limited in turn.
Another relevant issue for the Texaco/Chevron lawsuit is that protection on invest-
ment offered through IIAs is motivated by the desire of attracting new investment.
Cognizant of the stable and safe institutional environment, investors acting in antici-
pation of the protection provided by the IIA are more likely to invest, or more likely
to retain existing investment, in a country that is signatory to IIAs. In the specific
case, the Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty was concluded in 1993
after Texaco had already ceased to operate in Ecuador.47 That is, the application of
the treaty is offering protection to investors a posteriori. From the perspective of the
Ecuadorian state and citizens, the Bilateral Treaty is creating an asymmetric system,
bound to generate liabilities vis-à-vis foreign investors, without counterpart. In fact,
the retroactive application of the treaty is devoid of substantive rationale since the
Ecuadorian state is abdicating rights without any benefit in exchange.
The Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty is germane to the Texa-
co/Chevron case since, although the case was still being litigated in Ecuador, Chevron
used the ISDS mechanism under the investment treaty to initiate a case leading to
a binding arbitration award. In 2009, the company brought the case to a tribunal
constituted under the auspices of the PCA, located at The Hague in the Netherlands,
claiming that the judiciary procedures in Ecuador engaged in ‘unfair conduct’. In an
odd twist, after arguing in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the US courts should
dismiss the case since Ecuador was the appropriate and convenient forum to litigate,
the company argued that the ‘judiciary now lacks the necessary independence and
institutional stability to adequately adjudicate highly politicized cases’.48
Although the arbitration is divided in different tracks and the litigation continues,
the partial award of the second track decided in 2018 ordered the Ecuadorian state to
‘take immediate steps, of its own choosing (sic!), to remove the status of enforceability’
of the court decision against Texaco/Chevron.49 The assessment of compensation that
the Ecuadorian state might have to pay to Chevron for the damage caused by the
Ecuadorian judgment is part of the third track of the arbitration and not decided at the
time of writing.50 Effectively, the ISDS mechanism brought the focus on procedural
issues related to the Ecuadorian judgment and away from the practices and impact of
the Texaco operations. The arbitration might represent the last nail in the coffin for
the quest of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs to obtain redress through the courts and hold
Texaco/Chevron accountable.
III. RIGHT AND ‘RIGHTS’
The Texaco/Chevron lawsuit initiated first in the US and then in Ecuador is a promi-
nent attempt on the part of the affected stakeholders to use litigation as one of the
47 See, above n 2.
48 See Kimerling, above n 33, Oil, contract, and conservation in the Amazon, at 81.
49 Details of the international arbitration proceedings are available above n 2.
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strategies in environmental justice struggles.51 The recourse to the courts is part of an
early wave of cases of judicialization of environmental conflict, itself part of a broader
trend to bring to the courts and try to resolve via judicial means cases pertaining an
ever-growing range of issues of political nature. 52 In view of limited results that can
be obtained through dialogue, the judiciary route has been adopted as one way to get
redress related to environmental justice concerns and disputes over the socioecological
distributive effects of extractive industries.53 The Texaco/Chevron case shows how
difficult it is to obtain effective redress through the courts and the investment arbitration
process, based on the ISDS mechanism, played a crucial role in further obstructing the
process.
The Texaco/Chevron case shows how ISDS mechanisms generate a number of
conundra that go well beyond the specifics of the case. First of all, the investor–state dis-
pute operated in a case where investor rights intersect human rights, but the arbitration
mechanism did not reflect the importance of the latter and the fact that the protection
given to investors would detract from human rights of individuals and communities
affected by the way the investors operated. In fact, investor rights have been treated as
insulated from and privileged if compared to other rights, which is highly problematic.
The arbitration also undermined the right of access to justice of the claimants in
the Texaco/Chevron case, since it rendered unenforceable a final judgment of the
Ecuadorian judiciary and by so doing effectively deprived the claimants of a judiciary
forum to decide on their claim. Also problematic is the effect that the ISDS mechanism
has on the basic feature of modern states: division of powers. The arbitration award
orders the Ecuadorian state to render unenforceable a final judgment creating a conflict
of competence between the executive and the judiciary. In fact, the 2008 Ecuadorian
Constitution prohibits entering into ‘treaties or international instruments where the
Ecuadorian State yields its sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration entities’.54
The Ecuadorian state, following the constitutional mandate, unilaterally denounced
the Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty in 2018 and the agreement is
currently terminated.55 However, the survival clauses included in the treaty provide for
a sunset period of one decade and the arbitration clauses will continue to be effective
51 Joan Martinez-Alier, El caso Chevron Texaco en Ecuador: una muy buena sentencia que podría ser un poco mejor
(ALAI, América Latina en Movimiento, 2011).
52 Ran Hirschl, ‘The judicialization of politics’, in The Oxford handbook of political science (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell, The judicialization of politics in Latin
America (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
53 See Orta-Martínez, Pellegrini, and Arsel, above n 13, ‘The squeaky wheel gets the grease’?
54 Republic of Ecuador, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (Quito, 2008), art. 422.
55 In fact, the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution has many advanced provisions to protect nature and transition
away from an economic structure centre on extractive industries Alberto Acosta, El Buen Vivir en el camino
del post-desarrollo Una lectura desde la Constitución de Montecristi (Quito: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FES-
ILDIS, 2010); Eduardo Gudynas, ‘La ecología política del giro biocéntrico en la nueva Constitución de
Ecuador’, 32 Revista de estudios sociales (2009), at 34. Although these provisions did not have a direct
bearing on the Texaco/Chevron case they, together with the activities of the environmental and indigenous
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till 2028.56 The Ecuadorian government is currently in an impossible position, between
an arbitration decision, the due respect of judiciary independence, the constitution and
the duty to further the interest of Ecuadorian citizens.
IV. TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD
The Texaco/Chevron case is a prominent, and in many ways bold, attempt of people
affected by a multinational company to use the judiciary to hold the corporation
accountable and obtain justice in relation to the impacts of its operations on human
and environmental rights. The claimants initiated the litigation in 1993 in the USA
where it was dismissed in 2002, on the basis of a forum non-conveniens decision, and
then the suit moved to Ecuador. The final judgment by the Ecuadorian judiciary was
issued in 2013 and awarded approximately 9.5 billion USD to compensate and, as far
as possible, remediate the socioenvironmental impacts of Texaco’s operations in the
Ecuadorian Amazon. Meanwhile an arbitration process, initiated through the ISDS
provision included in an investment agreement between the USA and Ecuador, resulted
in a decision ordering the Ecuadorian state to render the judgment unenforceable.
Further arbitration decisions on compensation are pending and could generate large
liabilities for the Ecuadorian state, imposing the payment of substantial damages to
Chevron.
Although it is always challenging to hold corporations accountable, especially in
countries characterized by weak governance,57 the Texaco/Chevron case shows how
companies can leverage upon ISDS mechanisms to undermine the few existing oppor-
tunities to effectively appeal to the judiciary for individuals and communities whose
rights are violated by corporations. Effectively, the arbitration process between the
Ecuadorian State and Chevron focused on procedural aspects of the judgment in
Ecuador, but produced effects on the rights of Ecuadorian claimants, who were not
parties to the arbitration process. The ultimate result is that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
now have no forum to further their interests in the courts and they have been denied
access to justice.
Although the Texaco/Chevron case might be an outstanding example of the political
economy of corporate impunity, there are a number of corporations that used similar
strategies to shy away from their responsibilities.58 Considering the asymmetrical
power relations that are engendered by the use of arbitration mechanisms, social move-
ments and especially human rights and environmental activists are asking for ISDS
56 ‘Ecuador—United States of America BIT’ (1993), UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub https://investmentpoli
cy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bit/1337/ecuador---united-states-of-ameri
ca-bit-1993 (visited 16 April 2020).
57 Catherine Coumans, ‘Alternative accountability mechanisms and mining: the problems of effective
impunity, human rights, and agency’, 1–2 Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne
d’études du développement 30 (2010), at 27.
58 Robin Broad, ‘Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes: A Case Study of a Global Mining Corporation Suing El Salvador’, U Pa J Int’l L 36 (2014), at 851;
Lora Verheecke et al, Red Carpet Courts (Friends of the Earth Europe and International, the Transnational
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mechanisms to be abolished as well as working to prevent the signing of new IIAs that
include ISDS provisions.59
The lack of legitimacy of IIAs also leads to calls for the radical transformation of
investor–state arbitration in order to make them functional to the effective promotion of
socioeconomic development. Thus, IIAs could gain legitimacy if the ISDS mechanisms
are transformed into symmetric tools, in such a way that states and third parties could
use arbitration tribunals to obtain redress for the impacts of investors’ operations. On
the one hand, given the financial implications of hiring law firms and the expertise
necessary to navigate ISDS, the intricacies and duration of the arbitration process
would hardly make for a level playground for stakeholders taking on multinational
companies. A particular concern is the close-knit nature of the arbitrator profession and
the organic relationship of law firms with corporate interests.60 In fact, arbitrators, law
firms and academics have been identified as the ultimate beneficiaries of the current
arbitration system and as constituting an ‘oligarchy’.61 On the other hand, when it comes
to providing venues to address the impacts of investment operations, such a system
would still provide an opportunity to address the shortcomings of weak domestic
institutions—such as an ineffective judiciary.62 In fact, arbitration mechanisms could
become a venue for starting litigation in countries whose institutions, especially the
judiciary, are irresponsive to the citizens’ rights. In other words, arbitration mechanisms
could be turned over their heads and become a significant accountability mechanism
and a stimulus for investors to operate responsibly. In any case, arbitration processes
should take into account options to allow participation of third parties, dismissal of
claims in case third parties cannot participate and reframing of claims when needed.63
Meanwhile, taking stock of the current level of corporate power exercised by multi-
national corporations who hold sway over states and bar them from effectively enacting
policies that establish certain citizens’ rights to the disadvantage of investor rights,
several social movements have been arguing that national governments should act pre-
emptively. In fact, some countries have set moratoria on extractive industries’ projects,
in part due to the risks associated with corporate impunity and investors’ power to
constrain human and environmental rights and because of the associated financial
liabilities that could be generated for the states—the establishment of mining moratoria
in El Salvador and Costa Rica are cases in point.64 The concern is not limited to the
developed world, as exemplified by the case Rockhopper v Italy that started in 2017
59 See, ‘Stop ISDS: Rights for People, Rules for Corporations’ (2019), Stop ISDS https://stopisds.org/ (visited
17 December 2019).
60 Florian Grisel, ‘Marginals and Elites in International Arbitration’, in Oxford Handbook of International
Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration, Forthcoming, Forthcoming).
61 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Resistance and change in the international law on foreign investment (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 383.
62 Erasmus Institute for Public Knowledge, ‘Open Letter on the Asymmetry of ISDS’ (2019), https://www.eu
r.nl/en/news/erasmus-institute-public-knowledge (visited 16 December 2019).
63 IISD, ‘UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement’ (2019), IISD https://www.iisd.org/
project/uncitral-and-reform-investment-dispute-settlement (visited 16 December 2019).
64 See Broad, above, n 58. Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, ‘Poorer countries and the environment: friends or
foes?’, World Development 72 (2015), at 419; Rose J Spalding, Transnational Activism and National Action:
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because the state decided not to award an offshore oil concession to the company.65
The latter case is based on the Energy Charter Treaty and is being litigated before an
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal. ICSID
is an international arbitration institution, based in Washington, D.C, that is part of and
funded by the World Bank Group.66 The Ombrina Mare Concession67 at the root of
the litigation has been particularly contentious because of the potential socioeconomic
and environmental impacts of the operation ultimately leading the state to block the
concession after the exploration phase. Rockhopper is using a specialist arbitration fun-
der (a third-party funder) on a non-recourse (‘no win – no fee’) basis, leveraging on the
asymmetrical power distribution to essentially seek an advantage and be compensated
for the loss of prospective profits at no cost—potentially leading to a compensation of
up to 350 million USD.68 The liability claim caused a public outcry and on the basis of
this claims and following widespread opposition to specific oil concessions, the Italian
Parliament enacted in 2019 a temporary moratorium on oil prospection.69
Although currently the international institutional architecture is contributing to a
regime of systematic corporate impunity, the situation is also adding to the legitimacy
crises of international investors’ protection mechanisms –a process akin to Polanyi’s
‘double-movement’: a push to extend market forces disembedding them from society
followed by social reaction against the push.70 Cognizant of the issues associated
with investors’ protection, a range of strategies are being put in place by coalitions of
concerned citizens, social movements, activist scholars, and state authorities. These
strategies include attempts to radically revise the IIAs, transforming them into sym-
metrical mechanisms, or at least into mechanisms that do not affect third-party rights.
Simultaneously, the shortcomings are fuelling resistance to the signing of new IIAs
and contribute to moratoria pre-empting investments in extractive industries that are
most prone to generating human and environmental rights violations. Taken together,
these strategies are contributing to calls for a long-overdue radical revamping of the
current international architecture protecting international investors to the detriment of
competing rights.
65 See Verheecke et al, above n 58.
66 See, ‘Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean Ltd, and Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italian
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14’ (2019), italaw https://www.italaw.com/cases/5788 (visited 6
December 2019).
67 See, ‘Ombrina’ (2019), Coordinamento nazionale No Triv https://www.notriv.com/tag/ombrina/ (visited 6
December 2019).
68 See Verheecke et al, above n 58.
69 See, (Decreto Semplificazioni, dalle trivelle alle assunzioni, 2019)
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